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1DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 13/08/2016 Accident number: 808
Accident time: 08:10 Accident Date: 12/10/2010
Where it occurred: MF No.2, Archamazor
Kevron village, Darvoz
district
Country: Tajikistan
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)
Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded
ID original source: Name of source: TNMAC
Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMA-2 AP blast and
ML-7
Ground condition: hard; rocks/stones;
steep slope
Date record created: Date last modified: 13/08/2016
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1
Map details
Map east: 070°53'58.8" E Map north: 38°28'25.4" N
Accident Notes
Inadequate investigation (?)
Visor not worn or worn raised (?)
No independent investigation available (?)
Accident report
The accident report was made available by the national mine action authority in 2015. It was
made available in Tajik and has been translated. The original formatting and many pictures
have been removed. The original report is held on file. The demining group manager in
country was invited to make available the report in English (as it was originally compiled) but
declined. The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. Text in square brackets [ ] is
editorial.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the landmine explosion on 12 October 2010, which resulted in one de-mining casualty
from de-mining team #4 of [Demining group], a commission for the investigations of the mine
accident in the field was established among the representatives of the [Demining group] and
TMAC.
This incident occurred during the mine clearance operations in the field. The mine clearance
group belongs to the [Demining group] which is operating in Tajikistan. The tasking of this
area for mine clearance operation is in the priority list.
The commission for investigation comprised the following persons:
[Demining group] Program Director
2[Demining group] Operational Supervisor
[Demining group] deputy head of operations
DEPLOYMENT AND ORGANIZATION
Humanitarian De-mining Team #4 had deployed on 14, September 2010 to the district of
Darvoz, Arcamazor’s minefield area and departed from Dushanbe at 07:00 o’clock. The
Humanitarian De-mining Group comprised the following staff:
Name/surname and position: [All names removed]
Supervisor; nine deminers; Doctor; two drivers.
According to the TMAC task TS TM 40 MF 2 Arcamazor village, Darvoz district, a special
procedure was established and Red Folder Instructions prepared. [Name removed], Head of
TMAC Operations on 07 April 2010, sent this Red Folder Instructions to [Name removed] –
[Demining group] Operational Supervisor.
Based on TMAC tasking of TS TM 40 MF 2 in Arcamazor village, Darvoz district the
Humanitarian Demining Group on 07 April 2010 arrived in the field at 08:00 hours, and
established an administrative area on the same day.
ADMINISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE IN THE FIELD
All members of the mine clearance team were located in the northern part of the area and
living in a tent at a distance of 2300m along the highway of Dushanbe Kulyab. [Demining
group] has 13 employees who were working under the Head of Mine Clearance Team #.4.
De-miners were deployed by distances according to the safety requirements adopted in the
QSA. Members of the teams were having a 10 minute rest time, part by part, at the operations
Control Point.
During each 10 minute break, the teams under the control of the head of Group discussed the
issues of clearance and improvement of the work in the field according to the information
gathered.
The activities of the demining Team #-4 started on 07 April 2010, in the mined area. The team
works from 06:00 to 13:00.The de-miners work 50 minutes in the working area and have 10
minutes break.
COMMUNICATION
[Demining group] uses the following communication tools, mobile telephone, satellite phone
and HF-handy in the cars. The mobile phone connections are good in this region. [Demining
group] communicate from the field to the Dushanbe office through regular communication via
mobile telephone.
On the accident date, the team had mobile communication and the head of the group GB-4
[Name removed] reported to the head of operations of [Demining group] at 08.10.
EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS
The demining metal detector Ebinger 421 GC module was used in the field. The area test has
shown that the detector of the injured deminer was able to detect a small piece of iron in this
field.
3The deminers who were working in this area had the necessary [Demining group] set of de-
mining tools which are listed below:
 Prodder tools (2 types)
 Shovel
 Ruler 20cm
 Plastic bucket for metal
 Wood and line
 Big and small scissors/shears
 Chopper
All PPE and de-mining equipment in the field was in accordance with the SOP.
The working areas were marked according to the SOP of the [Demining group] using the
marking stick 1.5 and 0.5 metres long painted red.
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT MINEFIELD AREA
Darvoz district is located near the border with Afghanistan. The accident place is 22 km from
Darvoz which takes approximately 38 minutes by car.
Before starting the work in this minefield according to the information received by survey team
and discussion held with the local community of Kevron and accident evidence, the
community were aware that the area was planted with fragmentation anti-personnel mines
type OZM-72, MON 50 and blast anti-personnel mine PMN-2, and ML-7. In this area in 1997,
one community member [Name removed], became a victim and lost one leg.
The minefield coordinates of the area are 38°28'25.4" N: 070°53'58.8" E. The total
approximate area of the mined area is 25,000m and up until 11th October, the team had
cleared an area of 11,139 m2. Due to the high vegetation in the area the de-mining team
faces difficulties for mine clearance operation.
MINE ACCIDENT AREA IN THE MINEFIELD OF ARJAI MAZOR (KEVRON), N. DARVOZ
EXPLOSION
As a result of a PMN-2 and ML-7 mine explosion on 12 October 2010 at 8:10 a deminer from
team#4 was injured. The team leader [Name removed] reported via cell phone to the
[Demining group] Operational Management at 08.12 o’clock.
At 08:16 the Head of the Operational Management of [Demining group] Mr.[Name removed]
reported to the radio-operator [Name removed] about mine explosion in the mine field No. 2 -
Arjamazor village Kevron. A deminer of the group #4 [the Victim] was injured from PMN-2 and
ML-7. Their characteristics are indicated in below table.
TYPE OF MINES
PMN – 2: production – Russia; plastic; Weight - 450gr; Main charge: 100gr; Colour - green
and top cross black; Method of activation- pressure; Activation weight - more than 3 kg.
Russian-ML7; plastic; Weight 100 grams; Main charge 40 grams; Length 6.9 cm; Height 3cm.
[Drawings and sketches of mine types removed.]
Evacuation plan from the place of explosion to the hospital of the Darvoz district [Picture
removed].
4CHAIN OF EVENTS AND PROCEEDINGS
6:47 Operation started in the field.
8:06 [Name removed] Reported from clearance operation.
8:16 Explosion in ММ TS TM # 40 MF 2 Archamazor, МАТ-4, deminer injured [Name 
removed].
8:17 Report about accident in the minefield.
8:22 Report about accident, victim treated by the field doctor/medic.
8:28 Accident Report from the field to TMAC.
8:30-8:35 Stopping operations in all mine clearance areas.
8:41 Preliminary report about casualty, amputation of left hand, face fragmentation, eyes
unknown.
8:52 His left hand (Fist) was amputation, the face was wounded with fragmentation.
9:09 The injured deminer taken to the medic and taken by ambulance to the district
hospital.
9:39 The ambulance and medic arrived in the district hospital:
9:48 Victim’s condition was reported as: burned eyes, broken left hand , unconscious, face
and lips swollen.
9:51 Based on the preliminary report on the eye injury, it was decided that the victim
should be transferred to Dushanbe hospital.
10:35 According to [a witness who] was in the area of explosion, the deminer was working
without head/face protection.
10:55 According to the preliminary report, after investigation of the explosion place, it was
found that the visor was approximately 2.5 meters away from the place of work.
10:56 After doctors’ investigation, it was reported that the Victim’s left hand was seriously
injured with severely damaged fingers and the eyes received fragments.
11:10 Preliminary accident report made to Head Office.
12:02 Medics with injured deminer move towards Dushanbe city.
14:53 Medics with injured deminer arrive at the minefield Shoun base #5. They make
bandaging, injection and after that they will move on to Dushanbe.
16:35 Medic team arrives in Kulob city and report the situation of the injured deminer as
satisfactory.
17:00 - 21:30 Doctors from Qariya-Bolo hospital are informed and gathered for support
21:30 Deminer casualty arrives at the Hospital in Dushanbe and first aid is given.
22:00 Deminer casualty as taken to the doctor for general medical investigation.
During the discussion with the head of the Demining team #4, it was found that the de-miner
[the Victim] after break-time moved toward [another deminer] to replace him. He was
searching the lane without wearing his face protection. At the same time the head of team #4
and other deminers were working in the field.
5[The Victim] took a detector and identified a signal and without wearing the visor started
excavation with small shovel to find signal. At 08:10 the explosion happened and the victim
was thrown back from the line of the operation. The head of team ordered to take the deminer
out from the field. The stretcher was brought to injured de-miner by [Name removed] and [six
names removed] and they took the injured to the doctor at 08.20. The doctor provided first aid
at 08.22 hours and they moved toward ambulance. They arrived at 08.50 in front of the
ambulance and provided relevant medicine. At 08.55 the Ambulance moved to the district
hospital of Darvoz.
During medical operation, the following three people were accompanying the victim:
• [Demining group] medical coordinator [Name removed].
• Doctor GB 4 [Name removed]
• One person from the team who had the same blood group.
FAILURE/MISTAKE
As a result of the investigation, it was identified that that due to the unprofessional and
negligent behaviour of the head of team #4 and not following the SOP, the deminer [the
Victim] entered to the hazardous area without wearing the face visor. As a consequence of
not following of the SOP, the deminer suffered extreme injury in the accident.
The list of the people who provided first aid at the day of explosion according to the below
plan in the mine field (annex)
Investigation in the explosion area
Visor located 1,5 m from the accident place at 3000
Basestick located 40 cm from the accident place
Detector located 35 cm from the accident place
[A collection of large and small rocks was shown in other photographs.]
CONCLUSION
1. The group was given the assignment as part of the ongoing mine clearance project of
[Demining group] for mine clearance in the Darvoz districts, GBAO.
2. The minefield where the demining group was conducting mine clearance operation is
considered a high level risk by [Demining group] and TMAC.
63. [The Victim] graduated from the Russian Military Institute and he worked as a teacher at
the Tajikistan Military Institute. Based on Tajikistan Mine Action Centre’s (TMAC) request
letter dated on 19 March 2010 and according to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic‘s
decree No.101 in March 31, 2010, he was seconded to the TMAC. [TMAC then assigned him
to work with the demining group.] In [Demining group] [the Victim] had been working as a
deminer and become highly experienced. He had sufficient knowledge on demining
equipment and had participated in many demining training courses and received certificates.
4. This accident occurred due to the negligence and lack of control of the head of team #4,
who had confidence in the skills of the deminer. The deminer disregarded the safety rules and
failed to act in accordance with SOP.
5. The protective apron prevented the body of the [the Victim] from receiving injuries.
Perhaps, if [the Victim] had on the protection mask, he would not have received severe
physical injuries on his face.
6. This was an anti-personnel mines PMN-2 reinforced with an ML-7 anti-lift device. During
the searching for the signal using a small shovel [long trowel], the explosion occurred.
RECOMMENDATIONS
After the accidental explosion of this mine, it is recommended that conducting refresher
training to this team (and including other demining teams) be conducted in order to ensure
that this kind of the mistake will not be repeated.
When the deminer hears a strong signal from the detector, he should immediately report to
the international consultant or head of the team.
International consultants and the heads of the teams should be in the area of the operation
during the entire working time.
In all demining teams, the appointment of a deputy head of team is recommended due to the
large working area in some parts which makes it very difficult to control deminers.
During the mine clearance activity in the field, the head of the team should have the authority
to replace deminers. No one should take their place without permission of the head of team.
During working times, the heads of the teams should not be using mobile phones except to
take calls from the demining group country office. If this occurs, the deminers who are
working in their field should move out from the field before he communicates by phone. No
deminers should have a cell phone with them during clearance in the minefield.
Victim Report
Victim number: 1005 Name: [Name removed]
Age: Gender: Male
Status: supervisory Fit for work: no
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 85 minutes
Protection issued: Frontal apron; Long
visor
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor
Summary of injuries: minor Arm; severe Arm; severe Eye; severe Face; severe Hand
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eye; Finger
7COMMENT: See Medical report.
Medical Report
No formal medical report was made available. Photographs show injuries to the left hand and
arm, also injuries to the face with dressings over the eyes, nose and mouth and a deep cut on
the left shoulder.
In a telephone interview in November 2015 the Team Leader reported that the victim lost one
eye completely and lost 70% of the vision in the other. He also lost one entire finger and has
severe damage to others.
Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the Victim
was working without wearing his face protection and the error was not corrected. The
secondary cause is listed as “Victim inattention” because it seems that Victim simply forgot to
put on the visor. There appear to have also been significant “Management Control
Inadequacies because the list of recommendations include things that should already have
been in force. These include the need for supervisors to be present in the operations area at
all times while work is being conducted and stress the need for supervisors not to be busy
using mobile telephones during work hours: this may imply that the supervisor was out of the
working area and talking on his mobile at the time of the accident.
There is some inconsistency in the record of timings in the report. The time taken for the
deminer to reach the ambulance is explained in photographs showing the steep mountain
paths common in Tajikistan. The Victim had to be carried for more than thirty minutes before
reaching the ambulance and starting his road journey.
8The Victim’s left hand was injured and a broken trowel was shown in photographs. The
victim’s hand tool included a handguard which was not shown in the photographs. The
injuries to his left hand and arm imply that he was using two hands on the tool, with the right
gripping the trowel handle and the left pushing on the blade (often seen). Unfortunately it is
not recorded whether the Victim is left or right handed.
The investigation is considered inadequate because no effort was made to determine why the
explosion actually occurred. It appears probable that it occurred because too much force was
applied using a two-handed excavation technique. The inclusion of identical statements also
raises questions of credibility in a report conducted by the demining group itself.
